Blurred Lines: Combatants & Non-Combatants in Modern American Conflicts

By Michael R. Tancredi

Michael R. Tancredi is a third-year student at Albany Law School. He grew up in Hunter, NY, and graduated from the University of Vermont with majors in political science and history. After receiving his bachelor's degree, he chose to immediately begin his legal education in Albany.

While attending law school, Michael interned with the New York State Division of Veteran's Services, reviewing state legislation and assisting veterans in obtaining state benefits and assistance. Upon graduation, Michael hopes to move to New York City and pursue a legal career in public service.

This paper analyzes the morally fraught dichotomy between enemy combatants and non-combatants in a Post-Vietnam War world. The blurred lines encompassed by this juxtaposition are further complicated by the evolution of classical insurgency into the contemporary understanding of terrorism. The nature of modern conflict has produced competing approaches to the principle of discrimination, competing approaches that require that all parties to an armed conflict distinguish between civilians and combatants when conducting military operations.

Can the U.S. approach of discrimination rise to a reasonable basis of distinction between enemy combatant and civilian, or is a more narrowly tailored approach needed? Is self-defense a rational justification for unmeasured drone strikes against Middle-East villages suspected of formerly harboring enemy combatants? These are the topics and issues this paper addresses, through both a historical and pragmatic lens.

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To read the paper, open HERE.

Animal Law: Evolution and the Need for International Protection

By Myleah Misenhimer

Myleah Misenhimer is a 2016 cum laude graduate of Albany Law School. She earned her undergraduate degree in English, summa cum laude, from the State University of New York at Albany. She is also a graduate of the American Musical and Dramatic Academy in Manhattan.
During her time at Albany Law School, Myleah was active in the moot court program, competing in both inter and intra school trial and appellate competitions. She was also a member of the Animal Law Pro Bono Project, and continues to be a member of the Animal Legal Defense Fund.
Myleah is currently a first year associate at Rose Waldorf PLLC.
She prepared this paper for Professor Bonventre's International law of War and Crime seminar.


In 1948, following the atrocities committed against the Jews by Nazi Germany, the Genocide Convention was passed, elevating and isolating genocide as an aggravated crime against humanity. But what of the right to existence of entire non-human groups?  Have the “dictates of public conscience” and the principles of our nations expanded to the point where protection for non-human beings would reflect our communal notions of humanity and morality?

In a literal sense, a crime against humanity is a crime committed externally against humankind. Humankind is humanity, but also has humanity, and thus a crime against humanity can be viewed as a crime that goes against the collective conscience, whether innate or learned. In a time where domestic animals are regarded as family members or referred to as man’s best friend, where we, as people, can set up pet trusts to ensure a safe and secure future for our animals, where most nations in the world have independently adopted laws to criminalize the abuse of such animals, is it time for another convention to bring about internationally recognized animal laws?

The bond between humans and animals was formed in antiquity, primarily out of economic need.   Humans exploited animals for physical purposes, such as plowing fields, but animals also served metaphysical purposes. In her article, Attitudes towards Animals in Greco-Roman Antiquity, Liliane Bodson writes about philosophical views of animals. For example, in the 7th Century B.C., Hesiod made the ox his first servant. Though he asserted Zeus granted justice only to humans, Heisod would treat the animal servicing him with a basic level of care. Pythagoras believed after death that human souls transmigrated into other living beings, and consequently taught his followers to never harm an animal.

Plato believed in the dual soul of man; the divine half was shared with the Gods, whereas the spirited half was shared with animals. Domesticated animals in antiquity were attributed a certain level of intelligence, at least enough to offer consent, as evidenced by Plato’s classification of such animals as “willing partners in human culture.” The notion of consenting animals even extended into the area of religious animal sacrifice, where the sacrificial animal was said to have nodded to humans in assent before being killed.
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To read the entire paper, open HERE.

Israel v. Palestinian Authority (International Court of Justice)

Israel is Not in Violation of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention
By Kirsten Dunn

Kirsten Dunn is a third-year student at Albany Law School, scheduled to graduate in May 2016. She is also a candidate to receive an M.S. in bioethics from Albany Medical College.
Kirsten is the co-Executive for the student chapter of the National Association of Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA), as well as a member of the Elder Law and Health Law Societies.
Kirsten was recently profiled on the Albany Law School website: Family Matters: Dunn '16, Mother of 9, Closing in on J.D. (http://www.albanylaw.edu/students/spotlight/Pages/Kirsten-Dunn-16-Mother-of-9-Closing-in-on-J-D.aspx)
She wrote this paper on Israel v. Palestinian Authority, for Professor Bonventre’s International Law of War and Crime seminar, Fall 2015. 

LETTER FROM THE AGENT OF ISRAEL TO THE REGISTRAR

OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE . 

I have the honour to submit for consideration of the Court the Application instituting proceedings for Summary Judgment with regard to Israel’s alleged violations of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention (Israel v. Palestinian Authority).  Understanding that the Palestinian Authority is not a recognized member state within the United Nations, Israel hereby seeks recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the areas of Judea and Samaria through this summary judgment motion.  In the event that this Court cannot make such a judgment over the non-member state of the Palestinian Authority, Israel hereby requests an Official Advisory Opinion be issued in lieu of such Summary Judgment.

(Signed) Kirsten Dunn,
Agent for the Nation of Israel
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To read the entire paper, open HERE.

The Genocide Convention: Promise but Failure

By Kayla Molinaro
Kayla Molinaro is a third year student at Albany Law School. She is an Associate Editor for Albany Law Review and a teaching assistant for Professor Mary Lynch's Domestic Violence Seminar.
Kayla prepared this memorandum for Prof. Bonventre’s International Law of War & Crime Seminar, Fall 2013.

I.    Definition of Genocide 

Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) defines genocide as,

“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”^[1]

II. Genocide Convention and the International Community’s Duty 

Adopted in 1948, the Genocide Convention stated that states were obligated to prevent and punish those who commit genocide because it was a crime under international law.^[2]  The Convention further addresses the duty and responsibility of a state when it comes to the punishment of actors of genocide whether they are officials or private individuals.^[3]  Under the Genocide Convention, prosecution should take place in a “competent tribunal” and the UN can be called upon to take necessary action to prevent such genocide.^[4] 

Non-State Actors and Transnational Conflicts

The Changing State of International Warfare

By Tschika McBean

Tschika McBean, a co-Executive Editor of International Law Studies, is an LL.M candidate in International Law at Albany Law School. She is a graduate of the College of Law of Loyola University New Orleans. In addition to the United States, she has studied international law in Austria and Costa Rica. Her writings have appeared in publications such as the NYU Gallatin Literacy Project and Ithaca College’s academic journal. She was the president of the International Law Society at Loyola and she has interned or worked in several human rights organizations, including the Tompkins County Human Rights Commission, Citizens for Global Solutions, the Advancement Society and the New Orleans Family Justice Center. She has lived in five countries, spanning from Guyana to Morocco, and is currently working as a research assistant for Albany Law School's Distinguished Professor James Gathii.

This paper, like her presentation on Darfur that was published on this site earlier this year, was prepared for the International Law of War and Crime Seminar, Fall 2011.

The trend in global warfare, whereby States are forced to combat non-state actors such as Al Qaida and other armed groups who may or may not be supported by another State, is a pressing issue that necessitates a review of the current laws governing international warfare. In other words, the nature of fighting international conflicts has changed and the laws governing these conflicts must evolve as well. This is especially true in relations to securing accountability for the actions of rogue non-state groups that are independent of State support.

Furthermore, it is inarguable that present day international wars have moved beyond the confines of the Geneva Conventions, whereby the main actors (states, military combatants and civilians), their rights and responsibilities are clearly defined. By contrast, non-state actors, such as Private Military Security Contractors (PMSC), mercenaries and independent and State sponsored terrorists groups, are radically changing this equation. Many States are becoming increasing dependent on these groups to fight their wars, while the rights and responsibilities of these non-state actors remain nebulous.*

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* Citations to references in this introduction are available in the paper.

To read the entire paper, open HERE.