Music That Kills: A Nazi Tool in Their Genocidal Agenda

By Nate Altman

Nate Altman is a 2023 Albany Law School graduate, who is sitting for the July Bar Examination. He grew up in Andover, MA, and received a bachelor’s degree from Union College.

Prior to law school, Nate worked in the underwriting and legal departments of Mutual of America Financial Group and lived in Manhattan. As a 3L, Nate served as Treasurer of the Albany Law School Golf Club and was heavily involved in the Albany Law School Rugby Football Club. He previously served on the Moot Court Executive Board as a 2L.

Nate has been a law clerk for the past year at Hinman Straub PC and will continue full-time after taking the bar exam. Previously, he worked at the Schenectady County District Attorney’s Office as a law clerk in the Appeals Division. 

In his free time, Nate enjoys skiing, golfing, and cycling.

As a society, we are aware of the atrocities that occurred throughout Europe before and during World War II. The vast amounts of information available to the world documenting the Third Reich and its systematic oppression and extermination of the Jewish people and others is no secret. There were concentration camps, gas chambers, ghettos, wooden bunks stuffed with emaciated, dying people, mass graves, and firing squads.

Less commonly known, however, is the important role that music played in the Nazi facilitation and operation of prison camps. Music was used to physically break down, punish, dupe, humiliate, and murder prisoners. At the same time, the Nazis used music for their so-called entertainment. Prisoner-built orchestras, singing marches, and music "shows" occurred throughout the many concentration camps.

It was by design that music was a helpful tool in the decimation of Jews and others. This paper serves to enlighten the public on the Nazi's use of music during the Holocaust, adding music to the list of countless war crimes committed against prisoners and to the genocide committed against the Jewish people.

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To read the paper, open HERE.

Just War: Augustine, Aquinas, & Today

By Andrea A. Long
Andrea Long, a third-year student at Albany Law School, is the Executive Editor of the Center for Judicial Process. She is a magna cum laude graduate of the Crane School of Music at SUNY Potsdam. Andrea is a Senior Editor on the Albany Law Review, she served as Project Director of the Education Pro Bono Project, and she works year-round as a law clerk in the Office of General Counsel of New York State United Teachers. She was both the winner and Best Oral Advocate of the 2011 Domenick L. Gabrielli Appellate Advocacy Moot Court Competition. For the Fall 2012 semester, Andrea is a legal intern in the law school's Domestic Violence Prosecution Hybrid Clinic.
Andrea's essay is the second in the series on Just War prepared for the International Law of War & Crime Seminar, Fall 2012.


Just war is a concept that has been widely debated and philosophized for as long as there has been war. It offers a moderate view of war that is appealing: the concept that in certain circumstances, war is justified without being morally wrong.

Just war encompasses two separate prongs. The first is jus ad bellum, or the right to go to war, and the second is jus in bello, or proper conduct within war.[1] Both prongs must be met in order to consider a war just.

The right to go to war is typically thought to mean war waged in self-defense, or sometimes in defense of another nation. Conduct within war also must be proper in order for the war to be considered just. Proper conduct could mean a proportional response or fair treatment of prisoners of war.

Two philosophers in particular, Augustine and Aquinas, are known for their contributions to just war theory.  Augustine was heavily influenced by his Christian beliefs and the religious beliefs of society in general.[2] His notions of what just war meant to people and Christians were radical for his time period. However, Augustine himself saw the just war concept as an extension of Christian beliefs, rather than a philosophy that diverged from them.